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“ASLEEP AT THE SWITCH”? THE NEED  
TO HOLD SOPHISTICATED CREDITORS TO 
HIGHER STANDARDS IN CHAPTER 11 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that a family of five has asked you to customize a car that 
would accommodate each of their individual tastes—something modern 
with a retro feel, with all of the latest features but without any of the clutter, 
a unique body design with their family crest, and more. You spend hours 
devising a plan, present your specifications for every aspect of the project, 
and hearing no objection from your clients, you begin construction of the 
car—poring over every detail until you most certainly have outdone 
yourself and created a masterpiece. Although the husband and children nod 
eagerly in approval, the wife now objects and reveals that she doesn’t care 
too much for the leather interior. “Sorry,” she says, “but we won’t be taking 
the car like this.” 
Why hadn’t she protested earlier? Your clients were fully notified of 
your plans—down to every last detail. Nevertheless, you can certainly make 
the changes, but at what additional cost? As a seller, however, you are not 
without protection. The Uniform Commercial Code and common law have 
evolved to provide both sellers and buyers alike with procedural rights and 
remedies to protect their competing interests. 1 In contrast, however, the 
Bankruptcy Code and common law still struggle to reconcile competing 
interests of debtors and creditors. Unlike our family of five, Chapter 11 
bankruptcy reorganization proceedings involve potentially thousands of 
claimants.2 Yet, according to one critic, the nature of the provisions in the 
Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the 
Federal Rules), in conjunction with general disagreement over the 
“fundamental mechanics” of Chapter 11, have “render[ed] bankruptcy court 
orders, including orders of confirmation, and plans highly unstable.” 3 
Instability threatens the purpose of reorganization, which requires finality to                                                                                                                                 
 1. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC), a seller is not without protection. 
Particularly in sales of “specially manufactured goods” and nonconforming tenders, sellers have a 
statutory right to cure a defect upon receiving timely notice, and—in cases of breach of contract—
recover the contract price. UCC § 2-201(3)(a) (2014); see also Thomas R. Malia, Sales: 
“Specially Manufactured Goods” Statute of Frauds Exception in UCC § 2-201(3)(a), 45 A.L.R. 
4th 1126 § 3 (1986) (identifying contracts for specially manufactured goods and not suitable for 
sale to others as enforceable where sellers have taken substantial steps to manufacture goods). 
However, the UCC and common-law protections are not without fault. One commentator 
criticizes courts for overprotecting consumers. Harry G. Prince, Overprotecting the Consumer? 
Section 2-607(3)(a) Notice of Breach in Nonprivity Context, 66 N.C. L. REV. 107 (1987). 
 2. Robert M. Lawless, Realigning the Theory and Practice of Notice in Bankruptcy Cases, 29 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215, 1218 (1994) (pointing out that reorganization can involve thousands 
of claimants). 
 3. Ralph E. Avery, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Principles of Res Judicata, 102 COM. L.J. 
257, 304–05 (1997). 
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ensure that creditors are protected and debtors are afforded a “fresh start.” 
A recent opinion by the Fifth Circuit, In re S. White Transportation, 4 
demonstrates the instability of Chapter 11 orders of confirmation and calls 
attention to the need for greater protection for commercial debtors seeking 
relief. Under the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, a creditor that receives effective 
notice repeatedly throughout Chapter 11 proceedings can thwart 
reorganization by asserting its claim even after the court has approved a 
final plan. The opinion challenges the authoritativeness of confirmed 
reorganization plans and diminishes the impact of receiving effective notice 
by adopting an unprecedented participation analysis. 
This Note explores the implications, for debtors and creditors alike, of 
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in In re S. White Transportation, which requires, 
but does not outline, a need for “something more”5 than passive receipt of 
notice of bankruptcy to constitute participation in Chapter 11 
reorganization. 6  Specifically, this Note considers the decision’s 
implications for commercial debtors. Part I of this Note explores the 
purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization and traces the evolution of 
the Bankruptcy Code and common law through key circuit court opinions. 
The remainder of this Note analyzes the Fifth Circuit opinion in In re S. 
White Transportation, some important questions it raises, and potential 
solutions for consideration. Part II challenges the need for “something 
more” 7  by weighing the necessity of a “more than passive receipt” 8 
requirement and scrutinizing the sophistication of creditors involved. Part 
III evaluates the economic viability of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in 
permitting creditors to take a “wait-and-see” posture. Finally, this Note 
recommends holding sophisticated creditors to a higher standard of review 
during Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. 
I. CHAPTER 11: EVOLUTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
AND COMMON LAW 
Congress developed Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization to provide 
troubled individual and business debtors with a “second chance”—an 
opportunity to salvage and rebuild under the protection of judicial process 
in the interest of economic efficiency.                                                                                                                                 
 4. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d 494 
(5th Cir. 2013). 
 5. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 
695, 703 (S.D. Miss. 2012), rev’d, In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 
2011). 
 6. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 498 (holding that “meeting the participation 
requirement in In re Ahern Enterprises requires more than mere passive receipt of effective 
notice”).  
 7. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 473 B.R. at 509.  
 8. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 498.  
2014] Sophisticated Creditors in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 559 
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is 
to restructure a business’s finances so that it may continue to operate, 
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for 
its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets 
that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed 
are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap. Often, the return 
on assets that a business can produce is inadequate to compensate those 
who have invested in the business. Cash flow problems may develop, and 
require creditors of the business, both trade creditors and long-term 
lenders, to wait for payment of their claims. If the business can extend or 
reduce its debts, it often can be returned to a viable state. It is more 
economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves 
jobs and assets.9 
For these policy reasons, the debtor in possession 10  or appointed 
trustee11 is allowed to operate its business12 under the protection of Chapter 
11 by wielding the shield of the automatic stay.13 Effective upon filing, the 
automatic stay preserves the debtor’s estates and keeps creditors from 
attempting to collect claims that arose prior to the petition for bankruptcy.14 
During a lengthy reorganization process, which can take several months to 
over a year,15 it is in the interest of both the debtor and its creditors to 
proceed expeditiously in order to maximize creditor recovery and minimize 
further harm to the debtor.16 Successful bankruptcy reorganizations depend 
on the bankruptcy court’s power to bind parties to a single authoritative 
judgment 17 and, in effect, discharge debtors of prepetition liability upon 
confirmation of a plan.18 Debtors depend on the discharge of prepetition 
debt in order to effectively reorganize.19 
A. EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION: THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Traditionally, courts have applied the principle that “liens pass through 
bankruptcy unaffected”—theoretically, even after Chapter 11 
                                                                                                                                
 9. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179. 
 10. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2012) (defining a Chapter 11 debtor as a “debtor in possession”). 
 11. Id. § 1104 (describing how trustees may be appointed in Chapter 11 cases). 
 12. Id. § 1108. 
 13. Id. § 362(a). 
 14. Id. 
 15. The Bankruptcy Code affords debtors with an exclusive right to file a plan of 
reorganization for the first 120 days of a case, and the period may be extended but cannot exceed 
eighteen months. Id. § 1121(b), (d). 
 16. Eric S. Richards, Due Process Limitations on the Modification of Liens Through 
Bankruptcy Reorganization, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 43, 108 (1997). 
 17. Lawless, supra note 2, at 1216.  
 18. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1). 
 19. Laura B. Bartell, Due Process for the Unknown Future Claim in Bankruptcy—Is This 
Notice Really Necessary?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 339, 340–41 (2004). 
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confirmation. 20  The principle dates back to the nineteenth century U.S. 
Supreme Court opinion in Long v. Bullard, nearly ninety-two years before 
the modern Bankruptcy Code was first enacted in 1978. 21  In Long v. 
Bullard,22 the Court held that where “the creditor neither proved his debt in 
bankruptcy nor released his lien . . . , his security was preserved not 
withstanding the bankruptcy of his debtor.”23 This principle, out of concern 
for unjust violation of creditors’ rights, was codified in the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898 24  and began to morph with the enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978. 25  Growing differences as to the extent of which 
debtors may be discharged of liability, however, challenge the applicability 
of the principle today. 26  Particularly in the context of Chapter 11 
reorganization, mechanisms that allow for claim abrogation or 
extinguishment make clear that “the principle that liens pass through 
bankruptcy unaffected cannot be taken literally.”27 
Section 1141, outlining the effect of confirmation, provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section, the 
provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, any entity issuing 
securities under the plan, any entity acquiring property under the plan, and 
any creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in the debtor, 
whether or not the claim or interest of such creditor, equity security 
holder, or general partner is impaired under the plan and whether or not 
such creditor, equity security holder, or general partner has accepted the 
plan. 
. . . . 
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section and 
except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the 
plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is 
free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors, equity security 
holders, and of general partners in the debtor.28 
                                                                                                                                
 20. Beth A. Buchanan Staudenmaier, Note, Survival of Liens: “Liens Pass Through 
Bankruptcy Unaffected”—Or Do They? In re Penrod—Challenging an Adage: In re Penrod, 50 
F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1995), 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 445, 447 (1996). 
 21. Id. at 447–48. 
 22. 117 U.S. 617 (1886). 
 23. Id. at 620–21.  
 24. Buchanan Staudenmaier, supra note 20, at 448 n.26.  
 25. Id. at 448–49.  
 26. Id. at 448 (noting that courts have disagreed on “the extent the principle is applicable” and 
have “differing perceptions regarding the scope of the debtor’s discharge”). 
 27. In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 28. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a), (c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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Generally, a debtor under Chapter 11 is discharged of liability upon 
confirmation of the plan of reorganization,29 and any property dealt with 
under the plan of reorganization, such as a lien,30 is cleansed of claims and 
interests and may no longer be pursued by creditors. 31 As a result, the 
process tends to be pro-debtor, or debtor-friendly, 32  consistent with 
Congress’s intent.33 But the Bankruptcy Code also protects creditors and 
their interests34 and requires that reorganization plans detail how claims will 
be handled going forward.35 The plans may “contain only provisions that 
are consistent with the interests of creditors and equity security holders and 
with public policy.” 36  To minimize harm to creditors and to provide 
creditors with a voice during this process, debtors are required to provide 
creditors with notice37 and court-approved disclosure statements containing 
sufficient information.38 
The requirement of effective notice, “the life blood”39 of bankruptcy 
law, codifies creditors’ interests to be heard on issues related to the                                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. § 1141(d)(1) (“[T]he confirmation of a plan—(A) discharges the debtor from any debt 
that arose before the date of such confirmation . . . and (B) terminates all rights and interests of 
equity security holders and general partners provided for by the plan.”).  
 30. “[L]iens constitute one of the interests that section 1141(c) extinguishes . . . .” Elixir 
Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507 F.3d 817, 823 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
 31. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c). Under § 1141(c), any property “dealt with” by the plan after 
confirmation is considered “free and clear of all claims and interests.” Id. 
 32. “[M]any bankruptcy courts view their primary job as facilitating the debtor’s successful 
reorganization, thereby maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate and the recovery of general 
unsecured creditors. Those are unquestionably key bankruptcy goals.” Craig Goldblatt et al., 
“Debtor-Friendly” Bankruptcy Courts and the Secondary Loan Market: Will the Supreme Court 
Change the Dynamic?, in LSTA LOAN MARKET CHRONICLE 134, 134–35 (2012), available at 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/Publicati
on/2012%20Chron%2021.pdf. 
 33. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179. 
 34. “[T]he Bankruptcy Code consciously balances those goals [of successful reorganization] 
against countervailing concern of providing appropriate protections for secured creditors.” 
Goldblatt et al., supra note 32, at 135.  
 35. Chapter 11: Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2014) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1123). 
 36. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(7). 
 37. Id. § 1125. Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(the BAPCPA), debtors now face stricter notice requirements pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 342. New 
Notice Requirements, AM. BANKR. INST., http://www.abiworld.org/webinars 
/consumerbankruptcyi/code/newnoticerequirements.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). Amending a 
previously nondescript requirement for notice, the BAPCPA now outlines in greater detail what 
constitutes effective notice. Id. 
 38. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (“[T]here is transmitted to such holder the plan or a summary of the 
plan, and a written disclosure statement approved, after notice and a hearing, by the court as 
containing adequate information . . . .”). 
 39. Ben Feder, “I’ll Sit This One Out”—Fifth Circuit Permits Secured Creditor to Disregard 
Chapter 11 Case, BANKR. L. INSIGHTS (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.bankruptcylawinsights.com 
/2013/08/ill-sit-this-one-out-fifth-circuit-permits-secured-creditor-to-disregard-chapter-11-case/ 
(“Notice to creditors and interested parties is the life blood of bankruptcy practice, particularly 
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treatment of their claims.40 As the debtor in possession or trustee negotiates 
and structures a business reorganization, “[h]older[s] of a claim or interest” 
on notice are given the opportunity to reject or accept the proposed plan.41 
Following a confirmation hearing and order, the plan of reorganization is 
binding on the debtor and all parties in interest, whether or not creditors 
have accepted the plan,42 on the theory that creditors of known claims have 
been given an opportunity for fair treatment and should not be permitted to 
unduly burden debtors who have attempted to resolve lingering issues.43 
Therefore, in the interests of fairness and rehabilitation, confirmation frees 
debtors from creditors’ interests and imports a res judicata effect on 
“property dealt with by the plan.” 44  However, confirmation of a 
reorganization plan under common law has been criticized as “provid[ing] 
the parties with a bundle of rights which are subject to substantial change 
for a bewildering number of reasons.”45 
B. EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION: THE COMMON LAW 
Prior to its opinion in In re S. White Transportation, under the guidance 
and “sound reasoning” of the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, 
the Fifth Circuit adopted the “default rule that a confirmed Chapter 11 plan 
may avoid liens not specifically preserved”46 and delineated the criteria for 
extinguishing a lien under § 1141(c).47 The court set forth in In re Ahern 
Enterprises, Inc. that to extinguish a lien under § 1141(c), 48  “[f]our 
conditions must therefore be met . . . : (1) the plan must be confirmed; (2) 
the property that is subject to the lien must be dealt with by the plan;49 (3) 
the lien holder must participate in the reorganization; and (4) the plan must 
not preserve the lien.”50                                                                                                                                 
chapter 11 cases where thousands of claims must be definitively resolved in order for a debtor to 
reorganize successfully.”). Some, however, contend that we should get rid of the notice 
requirement altogether. See, e.g., Lawless, supra note 2, at 1231 n.67. 
 40. 11 U.S.C. § 342 (requiring notice); id. § 1109(b) (giving creditors the right to be heard). 
 41. Id. § 1126. Claims that are “secured by a lien on property” are secured claims. Id. §§ 506, 
1128. 
 42. Id. § 1141(a). 
 43. In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 44. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c); see also Buchanan Staudenmaier, supra note 20, at 456.  
 45. Avery, supra note 3, at 305.  
 46. Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507 F.3d 817, 822 
(5th Cir. 2007). 
 47. Id.  
 48. Section 1141(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, with exceptions, “after 
confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and 
interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1141(c). 
 49. Courts are divided on interpretations of the understanding of “dealt with.” Depending on 
what they emphasize—for example, failing to deal with or provide for liens in a plan of 
reorganization—courts may be more or less likely to extinguish liens upon confirmation. 
Buchanan Staudenmaier, supra note 20, at 456.  
 50. In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at 822.  
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1. Before In re S. White Transportation: In re Penrod 
To extinguish a claim under § 1141(c), the Seventh Circuit first held in 
In re Penrod 51  that a secured creditor’s lien is discharged upon 
confirmation, provided the creditor has participated by filing a proof of 
claim and the debtor’s reorganization plan includes a provision addressing 
the lien.52 At issue for the Seventh Circuit was a plan of reorganization that 
provided for payment of a claim but did not indicate whether the creditor 
still maintained its security interest.53 The debtors, John and Alyce Penrod, 
were hog farmers by trade.54 Secured creditor Mutual Guaranty Corporation 
(Mutual Guaranty) held a promissory note secured by the Penrods’ hogs.55 
The debtors’ plan provided for monthly payments of Mutual Guaranty’s 
claim.56 However, when the hogs fell sick after the plan had taken effect, 
the Penrods sold the animals and retained the proceeds. 57  In response, 
Mutual Guaranty filed suit against the Penrods to enforce its lien and 
recover the sale proceeds.58 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court holding that Mutual 
Guaranty’s lien had been extinguished and enjoined, rejecting the 
interpretation that a plan could expressly deal with a secured creditor’s 
property claim and not a creditor’s interest or lien in the claim as 
inconsistent with the reading of § 1141(c).59 The court was concerned that 
to hold otherwise, a reorganized entity “would continue to be burdened by 
secured creditors’ claims by virtue of their liens, even if the plan made 
provision for those claims.”60 Thus, even when a plan did not expressly 
provide for a lien attached to property addressed in the plan, the Seventh 
Circuit held that the lien was extinguished following confirmation—
provided that the lienholder participated in the reorganization.61 
Following the In re Penrod opinion, the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have also applied the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 1141(c).62 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying                                                                                                                                 
 51. In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 461–62.  
 54. Id. at 461. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 461, 464.  
 60. Id. at 463.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507 F.3d 817, 821 
(5th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Penrod, 50 F.3d at 463); Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Reg’l Bldg. Sys., 
Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 254 F.3d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 
at 463); Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jardine Ins. Servs. Tex., Inc. (In re Barton Indus., Inc.), 104 
F.3d 1241, 1245 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Penrod, 50 F.3d at 462–64); FDIC v. Be-Mac 
Transp. Co. (In re Be-Mac Transp. Co.) 83 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing In re 
Penrod, 50 F.3d at 462–63). 
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principles from In re Penrod, recognized that confirmation of a 
reorganization plan only extinguished liens that were dealt with and held by 
participating creditors.63 Finding for the secured creditor in In re Be-Mac 
Transport, the Eighth Circuit determined that where a secured creditor was 
inappropriately denied an opportunity to participate in the reorganization, 
any lien held by that creditor survived the proceedings and was not 
extinguished by confirmation of the plan. 64  The secured creditor, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the FDIC), had filed and amended 
its proof of claim in the Chapter 11 reorganization of Be-Mac Transport 
Company. 65  The bankruptcy court, however, erroneously disallowed the 
FDIC’s amended claim and treated the claim as if it were never made.66 The 
Eighth Circuit recognized that such treatment denied the FDIC its right to 
participate in “the reorganization for purposes of voting and distribution,” 
effectively abrogating a creditor’s voice and interest in contravention to the 
Bankruptcy Code’s want for balanced interests.67 
Citing In re Be-Mac Transport, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
In re Barton Industries 68  reiterated that confirmation of a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy plan may extinguish a lien but noted that confirmation was 
subject to appropriate notice under §§ 102(1) and 1128(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 69  Effective notice is required in the analysis and 
consideration of whether a creditor’s interest was extinguished upon 
confirmation. 70  Creditors must receive notice of the treatment of their 
claims and have both an opportunity and sufficient information to make 
informed decisions about the reorganization plan.71 In the case of In re 
Barton Industries, creditors who received notice were not given sufficient 
information to adequately make a decision regarding their interest. 
Therefore, because the notice provided did not contain sufficient 
information, the creditors were not subject to the reorganization plan, and 
their interests were not extinguished.72 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, noting “every other circuit court 
of appeals to have addressed this issue has reached the same conclusion,”73                                                                                                                                 
 63. In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., 83 F.3d at 1027.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 1023.  
 66. Id. at 1027.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jardine Ins. Servs. Tex., Inc. (In re Barton Indus., Inc.), 104 F.3d 
1241 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 69. Id. at 1245.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 1246. 
 73. Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 254 F.3d 
528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing In re Barton Indus., Inc., 104 F.3d at 1246; FDIC v. Be-Mac 
Transp. Co. (In re Be-Mac Transp. Co.), 83 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 1996); In re Penrod, 50 
F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
2014] Sophisticated Creditors in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 565 
also held the plain meaning of § 1141(c) implicated that liens are not 
preserved following confirmation of the plan of reorganization, and the 
Fourth Circuit would not excuse a creditor that failed to make a timely 
objection.74 In In re Regional Building Systems, the Fourth Circuit found 
the creditor was notified of the Chapter 11 petition, actively participated in 
the proceedings, and had time to object to the plan of reorganization.75 And 
yet, the creditor “fell asleep at the switch” and made no objections prior to 
plan confirmation.76 “Having done so,” according to the Fourth Circuit, “it 
cannot escape the consequences of its inaction,” and the court affirmed the 
district court’s decision to extinguish the creditor’s lien.77 
Under the guidance and “sound reasoning” of the Fourth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit first examined the issue of § 
1141(c)’s participation requirement in In re Ahern Enterprises. The creditor 
of In re Ahern Enterprises, Elixir Industries, Inc. (Elixir), submitted a proof 
of claim in the Chapter 11 reorganization of Ahern Enterprises, Inc. 
(Ahern).78 The bankruptcy court confirmed Ahern’s plan, which addressed 
property attached to Elixir’s lien and did not specifically preserve the lien.79 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, Elixir’s claim was extinguished upon 
confirmation. 80  Elixir, however, took issue with Ahern’s voluntary 
conversion from Chapter 11 reorganization to Chapter 7 liquidation.81 Elixir 
challenged the discharge of its lien because it contended the plan had not 
been substantially consummated and was not void upon confirmation of the 
Chapter 11 plan.82 Despite Elixir’s protests, the Fifth Circuit adopted and 
applied a four-part test—finding the reorganization plan had been 
confirmed, the property had been dealt with, the lien holder had 
participated, and the plan had not preserved the lien.83 Therefore, the Fifth 
Circuit held, as other circuit courts have, that confirmation extinguished the 
participating creditor’s lien.84  
The In re Ahern Enterprises opinion highlighted a point of ambiguity in 
judicial interpretation that the Fifth Circuit would later revisit in In re S. 
White Transportation. The Fifth Circuit noted that the requirement of 
secured creditors to participate in Chapter 11 reorganization is a “judicial 
gloss on section 1141(c).”85 In other words, the court acknowledges that                                                                                                                                 
 74. In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc., 254 F.3d at 533. 
 75. Id. at 532.  
 76. Id. at 533.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 819. 
 79. Id. at 819–20. 
 80. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2012). 
 81. In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at 819.  
 82. Id. at 820.  
 83. Id. at 822–24.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 823 (emphasis added).  
566 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
there is no statutory requirement of participation in the plain reading of  
§ 1141(c).86 Participation, the court explained, “ensures that the secured 
creditor has notice of the plan and its potential effect on the creditor’s 
lien,” 87  and in at least one instance of judicial interpretation, the only 
participation deemed necessary was a creditor’s receipt of notice and 
opportunity to object.88 Although it determined that Elixir’s proof of claim 
constituted a “sufficient level of participation,”89 the court refrained from 
adopting a standard or definition for understanding sufficiency of 
participation. 
Through its opinion in In re S. White Transportation, the Fifth Circuit 
has implemented a vague standard of participation that deviates from 
common-law analysis and the balance of interests. Creditors are essentially 
permitted to fall “asleep at the switch”90 and preserve their liens, even after 
confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, because notice alone 
under the Fifth Circuit is insufficient to meet the participation requirement 
of the In re Ahern Enterprises test.91 
2. In re S. White Transportation: A Decade-Old Relationship 
Beginning in 2004, Acceptance Loan Co. (Acceptance) became 
involved in extensive litigation in state court surrounding the validity of its 
security interest in an office building in Saucier, Mississippi (the 
Mississippi Property), owned by S. White Transportation, Inc. (SWT).92 
Acceptance and SWT disputed whether the individuals signing two deeds 
of trust in 2002 and 200493 had the authority to bind SWT, and if valid, 
whether the deeds would validate Acceptance’s lien on the Mississippi 
Property.94 If the lien were valid, Acceptance would have first priority over                                                                                                                                 
 86. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2012). 
 87. In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at 823.  
 88. Id. (citing Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 
251 B.R. 274, 287 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000)).  
 89. Id. In a footnote, the court distinguished In re Be-Mac Transport Co., where the FDIC had 
filed a proof of claim and attempted to file an amendment to the claim, but the Be-Mac court 
ultimately held that plan confirmation did not void the FDIC’s lien. Id. at 823 n.4 (citing FDIC v. 
Be-Mac Transp. Co. (In re Be-Mac Transp. Co.), 83 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 1996)). The Be-
Mac court found that disallowing the amended claim had the effect of a creditor not filing a proof 
of claim. In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., 83 F.3d at 1027. 
 90. In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc., 254 F.3d at 533. 
 91. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d 
494, 496 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The parties agree that the first, second, and fourth conditions of the In 
re Ahern Enterprises test are met by the facts of this case; they only dispute whether Acceptance’s 
passive receipt of notice constitutes participation within the meaning of this test.”). 
 92. Id. at 495.  
 93. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc., (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 
695, 697 (S.D. Miss. 2012), rev’g In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 
2011). 
 94. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509, 512 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011), rev’d, 
Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc., (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 695 (S.D. 
Miss. 2012). 
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three other creditors that also had perfected security interests in the same 
property.95 
Nearly six years later, on May 17, 2010, SWT voluntarily filed a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.96 The question of Acceptance’s lien on the 
property still had not yet been settled at the time of filing. 97  In the 
documentation accompanying the bankruptcy petition, SWT identified 
Acceptance on Schedule D to the petition as a secured claim creditor and 
noted Acceptance’s disputed interest over the Mississippi Property. 98 
Effective notice of SWT’s ongoing bankruptcy was served on Acceptance 
on several occasions, but Acceptance never got involved with the 
proceedings and never filed a proof of claim.99 
On September 14, 2010, SWT submitted its reorganization plan (the 
Plan) to the bankruptcy court and again noted that Acceptance’s lien was 
contested and Acceptance had never filed a proof of claim.100 The Plan 
described Acceptance’s lien “as a disputed claim upon which no payment 
would be made unless the Court ordered otherwise.”101 A copy of the Plan 
was provided to Acceptance, including a notice of the confirmation hearing, 
at which Acceptance would have had an opportunity to make objections.102 
Despite receiving repeated notice of SWT’s bankruptcy and open challenge 
of Acceptance’s claim, Acceptance remained silent and absent in the SWT 
bankruptcy proceedings, “in stark contrast to its aforementioned litigation 
activity against SWT in preceding years.”103 The Plan was confirmed on 
December 21, 2010.104 
Two weeks after the Plan was confirmed, Acceptance filed an adversary 
proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
Mississippi on January 4, 2011.105 Acceptance moved the bankruptcy court 
for a declaratory judgment stating that Acceptance’s lien survived 
confirmation or, alternatively, that the confirmation order be amended and 
provide for Acceptance’s lien on the Mississippi Property.106 
Acceptance argued that under In re Aherns Enterprises,107 “lienholder 
participation in the reorganization [is] a condition for avoiding a lien                                                                                                                                 
 95. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 495. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. at 513.  
 99. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 495.  
 100. Id.  
 101. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. at 513.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. Acceptance did not file a single document with the bankruptcy court, nor did it attend 
the meeting of creditors for this matter. Id. 
 104. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 496.  
 105. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. at 513.  
 106. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 496.  
 107. Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507 F.3d 817 (5th 
Cir. 2007). 
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through the Chapter 11 Plan Confirmation process.”108 As Acceptance had 
not filed a claim or participated in the proceedings, Acceptance contended 
that it had not participated and, therefore, its lien should remain intact.109 
The bankruptcy court denied the motion on both accounts, finding that 
effective notice sufficiently constituted participation and warranted lien 
extinguishment. 110  The court determined that the Plan’s confirmation 
voided Acceptance’s liens on the basis of 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c), 111  and 
Acceptance did not qualify for modification.112 The decision was appealed 
to the district court, which reversed and remanded, holding that 
“[s]omething more [than notice] was required” to satisfy the participation 
requirement.113 
SWT appealed the district court holding to the Fifth Circuit. 114 
Reviewing the case de novo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision, holding that Acceptance’s lien on the Mississippi Property 
survived confirmation of the Plan, 115  and “passive receipt of effective 
notice” did not constitute participation.116 
II. BREAKING DOWN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS 
A. THE COURT’S READING OF “PARTICIPATION” IN 
REORGANIZATION DEVIATES FROM PRECEDENT 
In preserving the creditor’s lien after confirmation, the Fifth Circuit’s 
opinion in In re S. White Transportation has added a new layer to the 
analysis by requiring “more than mere passive receipt of effective notice” to 
satisfy the participation requirement of In re Ahern Enterprises.117 Liens, as 
held in In re Ahern Enterprises and applied in In re S. White 
Transportation, are void if four conditions are met: (1) the plan is 
confirmed; (2) the property subject to the lien has been accounted for in the 
reorganization plan; (3) the lien holder has participated in the 
reorganization; and (4) the plan does not preserve the lien.118 The In re S.                                                                                                                                 
 108. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. at 514 (citing In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at 
823).  
 109. Id. at 514.  
 110. Id. at 519.  
 111. Id. at 520.  
 112. Id. at 523.  
 113. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc., (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 
695, 703 (S.D. Miss. 2012), rev’g In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 
2011). 
 114. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d 
494, 496 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 115. Id. at 496, 498.  
 116. Id. at 498.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 496 (citing Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 
507 F.3d 817, 822 (5th Cir. 2007)).  
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White Transportation opinion hinges on the court’s understanding of 
“participated,” in the context of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. 
Participation, as a “condition for avoiding a lien through the Chapter 11 
Plan Confirmation process,”119 is critical to the viability of a claim, and yet 
the standards and understanding of “participation” were and still remain 
ambiguous and vague. 
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis characterizes the word “participation” as 
“connot[ing] activity, and not mere nonfeasance.” 120  To support its 
interpretation, the Fifth Circuit referred to Black’s Law Dictionary, which 
defines “participation” as “[t]he act of taking part in something, such as a 
partnership, a crime, or a trial.” 121  And yet, one could take part in a 
partnership as a silent partner and satisfy the reading of “participation” 
without actively managing the firm.122 Silent partners—even undisclosed 
partners that provide capital but do not interfere with management of the 
partnership—are held liable for and bound to contracts that acting partners 
have entered into for purposes of their business.123 In a partnership, claims 
against silent partners are not estopped by virtue of their inactivity.124 
The Fifth Circuit also referred to the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 125  for the 
distinction between “‘activity’ and a ‘decision not to do something’ or a 
‘failure to do it,’” 126  but underlying the Court’s interpretation of 
participation in the health care industry are fears and concerns not present in 
the bankruptcy context, and bankruptcy notions of good faith and equity at 
risk are not captured by the Court’s analysis. In National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court held that the 
individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act failed 
under the Commerce Clause because congressional power to regulate 
activity did not extend to inaction, or a person’s decision not to purchase 
health care.127 The Court was concerned about potential abuse if Congress 
were authorized to use its commerce power to compel action—to compel 
those who have chosen not to have health care to make such purchases—as                                                                                                                                 
 119. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509, 514 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011), rev’d, 
Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc., (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 695 (S.D. 
Miss. 2012) (citing In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at 823). 
 120. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 497.  
 121. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 122. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 121, at 1230 (A “silent partner” is one “who 
shares in the profits but who has no active voice in management of the firm and whose existence 
is often not publicly disclosed.”). 
 123. 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 231 (2013). 
 124. Id.  
 125. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 126. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d 
494, 497 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587). 
 127. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587.  
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part of its regulation of activity.128 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that 
only individuals who purchased health care were under the purview of the 
Commerce Clause and said to have participated in the health care 
industry.129 
In the context of Chapter 11 reorganization, these concerns of abuse of 
power by authority or inappropriate compulsion of action—that shape the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of participation—are simply not present. 
Chapter 11 reorganization seeks to balance two underlying concerns (or 
competing interests) that serve as the bedrock principles of bankruptcy: the 
debtor’s right to a “fresh start” and the creditors’ right to recovery and 
protection of their claims. 130 Creditors under the Bankruptcy Code have 
always been required to act diligently; “creditors who acted with the most 
speed and diligence would be paid, and the other creditors would be left 
out.”131 Those that do not act diligently to perfect their security interests by 
the time bankruptcy commences are subject to avoidance by the trustee’s 
strong-arm powers, even if it gives a debtor’s other creditors a “‘windfall’ 
cash infusion” and appears inequitable.132 This is the nature of bankruptcy. 
The Bankruptcy Code’s pressure on creditors to act diligently is 
tempered by the recognition that modification of liens under Chapter 11 
reorganization invokes the need for “constitutional due process 
protection.” 133  Liens concern property rights protected under the Fifth 
Amendment.134 As set forth by Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co. 135 and its progeny, the protection of due process takes the form of 
adequate notices and opportunities to be heard: “An elementary and 
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be 
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”136 The Mullane 
                                                                                                                                
 128. Id. at 2588. The Supreme Court observed by analogy that with such a power, “Congress 
could address the diet problem by ordering everyone to buy vegetables.” Id. 
 129. Id. at 2591.  
 130. NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 717 (1997), 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/17bjuris.pdf. 
 131. 1 CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY LAW § 5:1 (2013). 
 132. Lack of Diligence Precluded Equitable Argument, WEST’S BANKR. NEWSL., Jan. 31, 2007, 
at 6. 
 133. Richards, supra note 16, at 45–46 (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the laws 
passed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause are subject to the requirements of due process.”); see 
also Avery, supra note 3, at 264 (highlighting the debate over the necessity for constitutional due 
process protection).  
 134. See In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Security Indus. 
Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76–77 (1982)) (asserting that a lien is property under the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment). 
 135. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 136. Id.  
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standard has been applied in the bankruptcy context137 and is incorporated 
in the Federal Rules.138 Sufficient notice is flexible and its form depends on 
context,139 but at minimum it must be intelligible for an unsophisticated 
creditor and “more than mere ‘boilerplate,’”140 containing 
at least some explicit and conspicuous information to alert the creditor  
. . . . At a minimum, the notice of hearing should direct the creditor to the 
pertinent part of the proposed plan which prescribes the treatment of the 
creditor’s lien. 
 . . . . 
. . . [T]he fundamental principles of due process require that the notice be 
sufficiently detailed to alert even an unsophisticated creditor that its lien 
rights are in jeopardy if it fails to object to the proposed plan of 
reorganization.141 
Under these standards, the Federal Rules ensure that all creditors—
particularly unsophisticated creditors—are put on notice that their interests 
are affected and require action before liens are modified or extinguished 
through reorganization. To ensure that creditors have actually received 
notice, courts look for evidence of participation.142 It is undisputed that 
SWT gave Acceptance effective and repeated notice of the ongoing 
bankruptcy proceedings.143 The bankruptcy court determined SWT’s notice 
satisfied due process requirements—enough to inform even an 
unsophisticated creditor—and was all that was required under In re Ahern’s 
“participation analysis.” 144  The bankruptcy court’s reading is consistent 
with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in In re Ahern Enterprises. There, the Fifth 
Circuit noted, without comment, that “[a]t least one bankruptcy court [in the                                                                                                                                 
 137. City of New York v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953); see 
also Avery, supra note 3, at 269 (“The Chapter 11 case law is becoming more uniform along the 
lines set down by the Mullane-City of New York precedent . . . .”).  
 138. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017.1. 
 139. Lawless, supra note 2, at 1231 & n.69 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972) (“It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority 
that due process is flexible.”)); Richards, supra note 16, at 104–05 (outlining notice requirements).  
 140. Richards, supra note 16, at 105 (citing Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89, 93 (4th Cir. 
1995) (“We do not think, however, that the Hansons’ inclusion of this boilerplate language in the 
plan avoided the liens . . . .”); 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 95:5, at 137 (2d ed. Supp. 1997) (“To allow the discharge of a creditor’s property 
interest through ‘boilerplate’ language in a plan without serving notice of the debtor’s intention is 
contrary to the due process protections under the Fifth Amendment.”)).  
 141. Richards, supra note 16, at 105 (emphasis added).  
 142. See Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507 F.3d 817, 
823 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that the requirement of creditor participation is meant to ensure that 
creditors have been given notice of the plan and the possibility of it affecting their property). 
 143. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509, 519 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011), rev’d, 
Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 695 (S.D. 
Miss. 2012). 
 144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
572 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
Fourth Circuit] ha[d] stated that the only participation necessary is that the 
creditor receive notice of the plan and an opportunity to object.”145 
Nearly six years later, the Fifth Circuit now qualifies its silent 
acquiescence to the idea that notice was sufficient to constitute 
participation. 146  In support, the Fifth Circuit cites two circuit court 
opinions—In re Penrod and In re Be-Mac Transport—“addressing similar 
issues [that] have required more than notice.”147 To be precise, the Seventh 
Circuit in In re Penrod hardly required more than notice. It merely stated 
that a creditor who filed a claim was subject to lien extinction, providing no 
further analysis on what constituted participation.148 The Fifth Circuit noted 
that the secured creditor in In re Be-Mac Transport—the FDIC—was 
permitted to maintain its claim after confirmation because not only had the 
creditor received effective notice, but it was also actively involved.149 The 
Fifth Circuit’s emphasis on the FDIC’s active participation is misleading. 
The Eighth Circuit opinion’s recitation of the facts makes no mention of 
effective notice.150 The question for the Eighth Circuit court was whether 
the FDIC’s claim was erroneously denied by the bankruptcy court and 
subsequently impeded the FDIC’s participation in the reorganization. 151 
After all, the purpose of giving notice is to ensure that creditors are given an 
unimpeded, unobstructed opportunity to protect their interests; otherwise, 
notice would be nothing more than an empty promise. When rights to 
participate were abrogated, the Eighth Circuit appropriately ruled that 
judicial error should not bar the creditor’s claim. 152  Still, neither the 
Seventh nor Eighth Circuit can be said to have required more than effective 
notice. 
In addition, the court remarked that it was “unable to find any case 
voiding a lien in the face of no involvement by a secured creditor other than 
                                                                                                                                
 145. In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at 823 (citing Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Reg’l Bldg. 
Sys., Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 251 B.R. 274, 287 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000)).  
 146. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d 
494, 497 (5th Cir. 2013) The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that notice was sufficient to constitute 
participation under the Fourth Circuit but stated that the facts leading up to the circuit court’s 
ruling indicated that more than notice was necessary. Id. (citing In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc., 251 
B.R. at 286–87). 
 147. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 497.  
 148. In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We have concluded that the default rule 
for secured creditors who file claims for which provision is made in the plan of reorganization is 
extinction and is found in the [Bankruptcy] Code itself.”). 
 149. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 497 (citing FDIC v. Be-Mac Transp. Co. (In re 
Be-Mac Transp. Co.), 83 F.3d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1996)).  
 150. In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., 83 F.3d at 1022. 
 151. Id. at 1027 (holding “[a]ny lien held by the FDIC should have survived the bankruptcy 
proceedings . . . because the bankruptcy court did not determine the lien’s validity before 
disallowing the claim and it improperly confirmed a plan extinguishing the FDIC’s lien without 
permitting the FDIC to participate in the reorganization as a secured creditor”). 
 152. Id.  
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the passive receipt of notice” 153 and dismissed debtor SWT’s argument that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa 
weighed in its favor.154 In Espinosa, the Court held that where a student 
loan creditor “received actual notice of the filing and contents of [a 
debtor’s] Chapter 13 plan,” there was no violation of the creditor’s due 
process rights by the bankruptcy court in confirming the debtor’s plan.155 
The Espinosa Court further posited that the creditor having “been afforded 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” “could have timely objected” to seek 
relief.156 In fact, creditors did not have a “license . . . to sleep on their 
rights.”157 As a threshold matter, the creditor filed a proof of claim during 
the pendency of the proceedings but made no objections until after the 
plan’s confirmation, and therefore under the Fifth Circuit’s standard, the 
creditor participated and was subject to the plan. 158  Although the Fifth 
Circuit dismisses Espinosa as “wholly inapposite” and limited to due 
process under Rule 60(b)(4), 159  the Espinosa Court’s emphasis on fair 
treatment of litigants and the importance of finality is far from irrelevant:  
Rule 60(b)(4) [which provides relief from judgment] strikes a balance 
between the need for finality of judgments and the importance of ensuring 
that litigants have a full and fair opportunity to litigate a dispute. Where 
. . . a party is notified of a plan’s contents and fails to object to 
confirmation of the plan before the time for appeal expires, that party has 
been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate, and the party’s failure 
to avail itself of that opportunity will not justify . . . relief.160 
Yet, on the basis of its interpretation of these cases, the Fifth Circuit 
indicates that creditors are entitled to more than due process and leaves 
open the question of precisely what is sufficient protection. The Fifth 
Circuit distinguished between “active” and “mere passive receipt of 
effective notice,”161 creating a spectrum between doing nothing and filing a 
claim, where due process has always been met by providing mere notice 
and an opportunity to be heard. Requiring greater protection than what is 
constitutionally necessary for parallel non-bankruptcy contexts 
demonstrates misplaced fear. Creditors such as Acceptance are protected 
when they are notified of the potential risk to their claims, how and when 
their claims will be modified, and when and where they have an opportunity                                                                                                                                 
 153. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 497. 
 154. In a footnote, the court dismissed the case as inapposite because the instant case did not 
“implicate due process under Rule 60(b).” Id. at 497 n.1.  
 155. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010). 
 156. Id. at 272, 275. 
 157. Id. at 275. 
 158. Id. at 276. 
 159. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 497 n.1. 
 160. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 276. 
 161. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d. at 498.  
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to be heard on their claims162 Particularly in reorganization proceedings that 
span several months, such as In re S. White Transportation, the fear is 
utterly misplaced for the sophisticated creditor. 
B. THE COURT’S HOLDING OVERLOOKS THAT ACCEPTANCE IS A 
SOPHISTICATED CREDITOR 
In reading the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, it is important to bear in mind 
two troubling facts that undercut Acceptance’s position and demonstrate 
that the reorganization process has been needlessly undermined. First, 
Acceptance and SWT developed a relationship as early as 2002 and 
engaged in communication and litigation over Acceptance’s security 
interest for several years leading up to SWT’s bankruptcy petition. 163 
Second, Acceptance had repeatedly received effective notice challenging 
the very interest being litigated,164 and according to its counsel, “‘in fact 
they were ignored’ due to ‘inadvertence and oversight.’”165 Acceptance is 
far from the ordinary creditor. It had competent counsel. 166  It was 
considerably more sophisticated than the average flesh-and-blood investor. 
Rather than protecting its interest reasonably upon notice, Acceptance, by 
sheer “inadvertence and oversight,” sat idly for months as SWT proceeded 
through Chapter 11 reorganization.167 Acceptance failed to act diligently, 
and it then contended, only after confirmation of the Plan, that its lien 
should have survived the Plan or the confirmed Plan should have been 
amended to provide for its lien.168 It “fell asleep at the switch.”169 
The purpose of reorganizing a company is “not a lawsuit in the ordinary 
sense . . . , but a complex exercise of legal method, corporate finance and 
business management,” 170  and the process of negotiating a plan of 
reorganization can take several months 171  and potentially continue for                                                                                                                                 
 162. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509, 519 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011), rev’d, 
Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc., (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 695 (S.D. 
Miss. 2012). 
 163. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 164. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. at 513.  
 165. Id. at 523. 
 166. Id. at 512. 
 167. Id. at 523.  
 168. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d 
494, 495–96 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 169. Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 254 F.3d 
528, 533 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 170. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (16th ed. 2013). 
 171. Section 1121 provides that a debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization 
for 120 days, a period the court may extend, but not to exceed eighteen months. 11 U.S.C.  
§ 1121(b), (d) (2012). If a debtor fails to file a plan of reorganization during the exclusivity 
period, any party in interest, with the exception of the U.S. trustee, may file a plan of 
reorganization. Chapter 11: Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 35 (citing 11 
U.S.C. § 307).  
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years. 172  It is essential, then, to devise a timely remedy. 173  Debtors are 
encouraged to file Chapter 11 petitions when “they can still realistically be 
organized,”174 can continue to operate,175 and can be “returned to a viable 
state.”176 Timely remedies mutually benefit and balance the interests of the 
debtor and its creditors. 177  The Bankruptcy Code provides tools to 
safeguard the interests of debtors and creditors alike, but with the Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion, we have effectively allowed creditors to circumvent 
protections afforded to debtors seeking reorganization—seeking a “fresh” 
start. 
Creditors “have a responsibility to take an active role in protecting their 
claims,”178 and as previously discussed, secured creditors that fail to act 
diligently are not cosseted and stand to lose priority to unsecured 
creditors. 179  Chapter 11 debtors may have many—even thousands of—
claimants, which puts creditors in the best position to prove and maintain 
their security interests and to decide whether they wish to pursue those 
interests. Provided that debtors have delivered adequate information for 
consideration, creditors must diligently assess notices to protect their 
claims.180 Yet under In re S. White Transportation, creditors—with claims 
that the debtor is fully aware of and ready to address—are encouraged to 
take a “wait-and-see” posture. 181  Under the new Fifth Circuit analysis, 
creditors that receive effective notice have not yet met the participation 
requirement under In re Ahern Enterprises that would extinguish their liens; 
therefore, they need not act timely or diligently.182 Neither acting timely nor                                                                                                                                 
 172. Chapter 11: Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 35.  
 173. See infra Part II.C. 
 174. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (16th ed. 2013). 
 175. Id.  
 176. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179. 
 177. Richards, supra note 16, at 108. 
 178. Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jardine Ins. Servs. Tex., Inc. (In re Barton Indus., Inc.), 104 F.3d 
1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Heins v. Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263, 1265–67 (10th 
Cir. 1988)). 
 179. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012) (trustees stand in the shoes of the perfect judgment lien 
creditor and may avoid secured claims that are not perfected at the time of filing). 
 180. In re Barton Indus., Inc., 104 F.3d at 1246 (citing Turney v. FDIC, 18 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 
1994)). The In re Barton Industries court determined that notice received by the creditors was 
defective for failure to include adequate information on the treatment of their claims. Therefore, it 
did not constitute adequate notice of the plan, and the claims were not affected. Id. In re S. White 
Transportation, however, involves a creditor that received notice with adequate information but 
did not act diligently to protect its interests. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 496. 
 181. See In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 496–97 (holding that nonfeasance does not 
meet the In re Ahern Enterprises participation requirement for lien extinguishment); see also Dan 
B. Prieto & Mark G. Douglas, Secured Creditor May Choose to Take No Action During Chapter 
11 Case Without Hazarding Lien Stripping, 9 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 749, 754–55 (2013) 
(discussing the In re S. White Transportation opinion as leaving open the possibility for debtors to 
“wait in the wings during the case and proceed to exercise its remedies in a more favorable forum 
after confirmation of a plan”). 
 182. See In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 496–97; see also Prieto & Douglas, supra note 
181, at 754–55. 
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sitting idly would affect a creditor’s right to recovery. Such a result unfairly 
tips the balance of interests and prioritizes creditors’ interests over that of 
debtors. 
Yet, should we hold sophisticated and unsophisticated creditors alike to 
the same standard? A similar question has been drawn for institutional 
investors who have fallen victim to Ponzi schemes.183 Writing for the court 
in SEC v. Nadel, Judge Richard Lazzara stated that the “investors [bore] the 
burden of showing that ‘red flags’ were not ignored when they invested 
their money in what is later realized as a Ponzi Scheme.”184 The district 
court denied the investors’ claim largely on the basis of their sophisticated 
status185 and lack of good faith.186 The opinion suggests, as the receiver 
Burton Wiand highlighted, “that sophisticated investors shouldn’t expect to 
be treated like any other victim when they ‘make these investments without 
the level of diligence that ought to be necessary.’”187 
Sophisticated investors are those individuals or entities that have the 
expertise or access to resources and information that allow them to evaluate 
their position and make educated decisions with respect to their 
investments. 188 Congress has recognized that sophistication may merit a 
different standard of consideration and has implemented regulations 
reflecting such a notion in non-bankruptcy law contexts.189 Congress and 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission have also adopted an 
objective investor sophistication standard, which considers “financial 
sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters, 
or amount of assets under management.”190 Consideration of the level of 
sophistication is not new for the judiciary either. Courts have considered 
party sophistication in various areas of law including tort,191 contract, 192                                                                                                                                 
 183. Reed Albergotti, Should Savvy Investors Get Their Ponzi-Stolen Money Back?, WALL ST. 
J. (Aug. 30, 2013, 3:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/08/30/should-savvy-investors-get-
their-ponzi-stolen-money-back/. 
 184. Order at 12, SEC v. Nadel, No. 8:09-cv-87-T-26TBM (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2013), 
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/florida/flmdce/8:2009cv00087 
/222528/1061/0.pdf.  
 185. Id. at 11.  
 186. Id. at 12–13.  
 187. Albergotti, supra note 183.  
 188. Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the Sophisticated Investor,” 40 
U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 243 (2010) (Sophisticated investors are considered to have “the 
wherewithal to ‘fend for themselves.’”). 
 189. Id. at 243 (Congress has permitted a private offering disclosure exemption under the 
premise that sophisticated investors involved in private offerings were of a class that would least 
likely benefit from statutorily required disclosure.).  
 190. Id. at 250 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15)(ii)).  
 191. William Jordan, Design Professionals May Be Liable to Third-Party Purchasers of 
Residential Condominiums, PROF. LIABILITY REP., Jan. 2013 (describing “sophisticated investors 
or creditors who can control their risks through their contracts and insurance coverage”). 
 192. Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. 
L. REV. 493, 495–96 nn.15–17 (2010) (citing Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Exec. Beechcraft, Inc., 
59 S.W.3d 505, 508 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (citation omitted) (“Sophisticated parties have freedom 
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and bankruptcy law. 193  Bankruptcy courts—and notably, even the Fifth 
Circuit—have examined creditor sophistication to determine whether 
creditors were at fault for delays in bringing claims.194 In reviewing the 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy case In re Royale Airlines, the Fifth Circuit advanced 
consideration of creditor sophistication as a reason to preclude a creditor’s 
claim.195 The court determined that the “legally sophisticated creditor,”196 
who was under advisement of counsel and extensively involved throughout 
the bankruptcy proceedings, impermissibly waited to file a complaint after 
the bankruptcy proceedings closed. 197  The court pointed out that the 
creditor was aware of the bankruptcy issues yet neither expressed concern 
nor sought removal of the trustee during the proceedings. 198  The In re 
Royale Airlines opinion is in line with the Fifth Circuit’s current 
participation requirement—extensive involvement and control precluded 
the creditor’s claim. 
Regardless of whether the creditor was extensively involved, the In re 
Royale Airlines court also raised an issue that should not be overlooked: 
It is well recognized that where a party is found to have by their conduct, 
either expressly or impliedly, consented to another party’s action, they are 
precluded from asserting a claim against that party for damages they may 
have suffered. “[A] secured creditor cannot remain silent with knowledge 
of the Trustee’s actions and not act upon it and then be heard that the 
Trustee made the wrong decision.”199 
                                                                                                                                
of contract—even to make a bad bargain, or to relinquish fundamental rights.”); Oppenheimer & 
Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 421 (N.Y. 1995)) (“If [sophisticated 
parties] are dissatisfied with the consequences of their agreement, ‘the time to say so [was] at the 
bargaining table.’”); 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.38 (2013) (“The more sophisticated the party, 
the greater the burden to read.”)). 
 193. See 9B AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1960 (2013) (citing cases where bankruptcy courts have 
highlighted a creditor’s sophistication or advisement under counsel in finding the creditor liable 
for violations of the automatic stay); see also 2B BANKR. SERV. L. ED. § 19:1364 (2013) (citing 
cases that use a factor test in determining punitive damages for violations of the automatic stay, 
including consideration of creditor sophistication by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit). 
 194. Clark v. Am.’s Favorite Chicken Co., 190 B.R. 260, 268 n.20 (E.D. La. 1995) (internal 
citations omitted) (“Sophistication in bankruptcy was considered by the Sixth Circuit in 
determining whether the notice to creditors sent in that case was sufficient and whether an 
attorney’s neglect could be visited on his clients. Other courts . . . have also considered the 
sophistication of creditors in determining the ‘fault’ of a creditor as to the reason for delay in not 
filing a proof of claim, whether the delay was in the creditor’s control and whether the creditor 
acted in bad faith[, and t]hus, the Court questions whether [plaintiffs] have ‘unclean hands’ as to 
knowledge of bankruptcy procedure.”). 
 195. Howard v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. (In re Royale Airlines, Inc.), 98 F.3d 852, 857 
(5th Cir. 1996). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re Peckinpaugh, 50 B.R. 865, 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1985)). 
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The court found that the creditor, having full knowledge of the 
proceedings and failing to take certain corrective actions, “implicitly 
consented to the actions or inactions” of the trustee.200 The In re Royale 
Airlines court recognized that a sophisticated creditor’s silence can function 
as implicit consent, and the sophisticated creditor is no longer permitted to 
object after the conclusion of the case.201 Regardless of consent, the court 
implicitly recognized that the creditor must have known during the 
pendency of the proceedings if it had any objections and should have 
addressed the issues prior to confirmation. Arguably, the reading of implicit 
consent could be limited to situations in which a creditor has been involved 
in all respects of the bankruptcy proceeding but failed to contest a specific 
issue—now said to have been implicitly consented to. However, the court 
does not appear to take such a restrictive view and addresses secured 
creditors with knowledge generally.202 Accordingly, a sophisticated creditor 
that has received effective notice yet remained silent and failed to act 
despite knowledge of debtors’ actions cannot now be heard to say “that the 
Trustee made the wrong decision.”203  
C. THE COURT’S AMBIGUOUS STANDARD IS NOT  
ECONOMICALLY VIABLE 
“It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, 
because it preserves jobs and assets.”204 Economic efficiency is at the heart 
of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, but the costs of bankruptcy 
proceedings in conjunction with the present opinion chip away at the core 
purpose of providing debtors with a socially and economically beneficial 
fresh start.205 When debtors voluntarily file for bankruptcy, creditors are 
unwillingly drawn into proceedings and stand to lose that for which they 
bargained. The Bankruptcy Code is aware of the risk and, together with the 
Federal Rules, provides mechanisms for protecting creditor rights and 
balancing their interests fairly. However, the Fifth Circuit has effectively 
permitted creditors to draw out proceedings and forced debtors to take 
every precautionary measure, including those that are not particularly 
necessary. “The adverse impact on the creditor’s property rights must be 
weighed against the administrative costs associated with additional judicial 
procedures.”206 
The In re S. White Transportation opinion imposes additional costs and 
burdens on an already time-consuming and costly proceeding. Bankruptcy                                                                                                                                 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. (quoting In re Peckinpaugh, 50 B.R. at 869).  
 204. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179. 
 205. Buchanan Staudenmaier, supra note 20, at 461–62. 
 206. Richards, supra note 16, at 106.  
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involves direct costs from participating in formal proceedings and indirect 
costs that stem from formal bankruptcy proceedings. 207 Direct costs are 
transactional costs such as “the legal administrative and advisory fees that 
the firm bears as a direct result of entertaining the formal bankruptcy 
process.” 208  Fees are required to commence and to continue with 
proceedings.209 Specifically, debtors in possession must pay quarterly fees 
to trustees handling the case ranging from $325 to $30,000 per quarter.210 
Generally, indirect costs are presumed to be “substantially larger” than 
direct costs and are the consequences of: “inter- or intra-group conflicts of 
interest, asymmetric information, free-rider problems, lost sales and 
competitive position, higher operating costs, and ineffective use of 
management’s time.”211  
As a consequence of these costs, the question is raised as to the 
effectiveness of Chapter 11 when “high costs drain troubled firms of 
resources.” 212  In evaluating the efficiency of reorganization, one critic, 
recognizing the diminishing value of a failing business over time, suggests 
selling companies if a plan were not adopted “by the end of the initial 
exclusivity period, which is 180 days if managers propose a plan or 120 
days if they do not.” 213  Although two critics find that the correlation 
between costs and time in bankruptcy is weak, their research has shown that 
for every year a Chapter 11 proceeding endures, “the total costs of the 
proceedings consume another 2.1% to 2.2% of the total distributions in the 
case”—approximately half the costs of the median Chapter 11. 214 Costs 
deemed administrative expenses take priority and reduce creditors’ 
recovery.215 
Holding sophisticated creditors to a different standard has important 
policy considerations. When creditors have knowledge and the resources to 
navigate proceedings, the In re Royale Airlines court compels these 
                                                                                                                                
 207. Lemma W. Senbet & James K. Seward, Financial Distress, Bankruptcy and 
Reorganization, in HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 944–45 
(R. Jarrow et al. eds., 1995) (“In principle, bankruptcy costs matter because they impose dead 
weight costs on the firm which are borne by the shareholders through an ex ante compensation to 
the creditors for the possibility of incurring these costs ex post . . . . To the extent that the 
bankruptcy process itself is costly, and if these costs are not avoidable, then capital structure 
decisions will be affected.”). 
 208. Id. at 944. 
 209. 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (2012). 
 210. Id. § 1930(a)(6). 
 211. Senbet & Seward, supra note 207, at 945. 
 212. Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 
Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 268, 268 (1994). 
 213. Id. at 293–94. 
 214. Stephen P. Ferris & Robert M. Lawless, The Expenses of Financial Distress: The Direct 
Costs of Chapter 11, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 629, 657 (2000). 
 215. 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
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sophisticated creditors to act sooner rather than later.216 Such a standard 
intends to discourage inaction and deny incentives to those acting in bad 
faith. All creditors are subjected to human biases that affect decision-
making, but sophisticated creditors have the distinct advantages of expertise 
and superior resources that allow them to facilitate efficiency and prevent 
bankruptcy proceedings from becoming needlessly burdensome. 217  The 
burden on debtors to challenge and discern the extent of their liability for 
each claim through adversary proceedings, for instance, is unduly taxing 
and costly.218 Drawing problems to light as sophisticated creditors become 
aware saves parties from the time and costs spent negotiating and 
renegotiating terms in what is already a time-consuming process. Efforts 
and expenses are better redirected towards effective reorganization to the 
benefit of diligent creditors and the public good. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Under the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, can it still be said that it is more 
efficient to reorganize than to liquidate? Confirmation after In re S. White 
Transportation becomes almost meaningless if negligent creditors are 
allowed to spring awake and strip debtors of finality. Courts certainly have 
good reason to protect creditors—especially those who are not adequately 
equipped to protect themselves. 219  But by extending similar latitude to 
sophisticated creditors, the Fifth Circuit allows secured creditors to remain 
silent and bring their claims whenever they are unsatisfied. Yet, how can a 
plan ever comport with a creditor’s expectation if the debtor never receives 
a response? A solution is needed. 
Perhaps the only foolproof option a debtor presently has to avoid future 
harassment is to bring adversary proceedings to preclude future attempts to 
enforce claims. However, such proceedings are costly and burdensome for 
both the debtor and the court. 220  Additionally, if the creditor is not 
interested in pursuing its claim, debtors’ proceedings are extraneous and not                                                                                                                                 
 216. Howard v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. (In re Royale Airlines, Inc.), 98 F.3d 852, 857 
(5th Cir. 1996).  
 217. Smith, supra note 188, at 262–67 (discussing factors affecting decision-making that may 
explain why sophisticated investors fell for Madoff’s Ponzi scheme).  
 218. Richards, supra note 16, at 106. 
 219. Id. at 105 (indicating that due process requires notice that at minimum can be understood 
by an unsophisticated creditor because claim modifications affect property rights.); see also 
Buchanan Staudenmaier, supra note 20, at 465 (remarking on courts’ concerns over inadequate 
protection of creditors’ rights where interests may not be fairly balanced). 
 220. Feder, supra note 39 (“A requirement that the mere provision of notice to such creditors 
can no longer suffice to address such liens would place a huge and costly burden on chapter 11 
debtors to effectuate the ‘participation’ of passive creditors in their cases, such as by utilizing 
Section 501(c) of the Bankruptcy Code to file proofs of claim on such creditors’ behalf.”); see 
also Prieto & Douglas, supra note 181, at 754–55 (discussing the In re S. White Transportation 
opinion as leaving open the possibility for debtors to “wait in the wings during the case and 
proceed to exercise its remedies in a more favorable forum after confirmation of a plan”). 
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cost-effective. Still, it remains a necessary, prophylactic measure for the 
debtor under the Fifth Circuit’s opinion. One scholar has advanced the idea 
of a Restatement of Notice so as to better delineate expectations and guide 
judicial interpretation, 221  but such a restatement of the law would not 
adequately address concerns of equitable treatment for creditors’ rights that 
underlie the Fifth Circuit’s want for “something more.”  
In light of the room for abuse by creditors and risk to debtors, the Fifth 
Circuit’s standard for something more than notice must be tempered with a 
heightened standard of scrutiny for sophisticated creditors. Already, the 
Bankruptcy Code makes a distinction between individual and business 
debtors in definition and treatment, 222  and it would not be far off for 
Congress to implement a statutory creditor distinction or for courts to hold 
sophisticated creditors to greater scrutiny. In cases where a statutory or 
common-law sophisticated creditor has received effective notice, the 
creditor should be presumed to have participated in the reorganization 
proceedings, or alternatively, debtors should be permitted to raise a 
sophisticated creditor defense. 
Ultimately, the lack of response from sophisticated creditors who 
actually receive notice will amount to those who choose not to pursue their 
interests and those creditors, like Acceptance, who choose not to act until 
an opportune time. By holding sophisticated creditors to a higher standard 
of review, creditors like Acceptance are prevented from taking advantage of 
the reorganization process, and costs of litigation are saved. Admittedly, 
holding sophisticated creditors to a different standard operates on a 
presumption that sophistication allows for exercise of good judgment. 
Recent events rebut the presumption; in fact, the great losses stemming 
from Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme were largely on account of 
sophisticated investors’ failure to conduct due diligence. 223  However, 
sophisticated creditors dragged into bankruptcy do not face the temptation 
of indolence induced by the glamor of a “marquee name” like Madoff.224 
Creditors do not stand to profit from bankruptcy and are subject to priority 
rules. 225  They can only expect to have claims fulfilled as to what they 
bargained for or run the risk of losing their interests altogether. 226                                                                                                                                 
 221. Lawless, supra note 2, at 1250. 
 222. Although the Bankruptcy Code defines the term “debtor” to include individuals and 
business entities, the Code specifies who may be considered a debtor under each chapter. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 109 (2012). Additionally, even within the provisions governing Chapter 11, 
distinctions are made between individuals and business entities. See, e.g., id. § 1141(d)(5) 
(specifically referring to individuals).  
 223. See Smith, supra note 188, at 253–60.  
 224. Id. at 264.  
 225. 11. U.S.C. § 507 (outlining the priorities of expenses and claims in bankruptcy 
proceedings and indicating that secured creditors do not receive a payment from the estate until 
other claims and expenses have first been accounted for).  
 226. In line with statutory priorities delineated in § 507, plans under Chapter 11 must be “fair 
and equitable” in the treatment of claims in order to be confirmed. Id. § 1129. Treatment is fair 
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Undoubtedly, sophisticated investors and creditors alike are still prone to 
error on account of human biases and, as in the case of In re S. White 
Transportation, poor counsel. In recognition of these lapses, court-approved 
notice of all relevant proceedings must be given,227 but following notice to 
sophisticated creditors, there should be no further obligation by the debtor 
to induce action or do more. The onus is on these creditors to act diligently. 
Creditors that fail to act diligently under the advice of counsel should bring 
a separate cause of action, where counsel should bear the weight of liability 
and penalties for acting in bad faith, as provided for in other aspects of the 
Federal Rules.228 
CONCLUSION 
Both debtors and creditors are entitled to equitable treatment and 
protection throughout the reorganization process. The Fifth Circuit’s 
opinion in In re S. White Transportation overprotects creditors to the 
disadvantage of debtors by requiring, but not articulating, the need for more 
than mere receipt of notice to meet the In re Ahern Enterprises participation 
requirement. When debtors provide effective notice, they confer their 
readiness to account for their debt and the security interests of their 
creditors. To allow sophisticated creditors that “fell asleep at the switch” to 
suddenly wake up and take action thwarts progress and incentivizes abuse 
of procedure. Sophisticated creditors must be held to a higher standard of 
scrutiny through a statutory or common-law definition that affords debtors a 
defense. Without such a safeguard, proceedings are unnecessarily prolonged 
and result in social and economic costs that run counter to the purpose of 
Chapter 11 reorganization. Where effective disclosure is made to a 
sophisticated creditor intimately involved with the debtor, as was the case 
for the creditor Acceptance, mere receipt of notice is simply enough. 
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